4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
dependabot[bot] 6d6302e327 CI: Bump the github-actions group with 2 updates
Bumps the github-actions group with 2 updates: [docker/setup-qemu-action](https://github.com/docker/setup-qemu-action) and [signpath/github-action-submit-signing-request](https://github.com/signpath/github-action-submit-signing-request).


Updates `docker/setup-qemu-action` from 4.1.0 to 4.2.0
- [Release notes](https://github.com/docker/setup-qemu-action/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/docker/setup-qemu-action/compare/06116385d9baf250c9f4dcb4858b16962ea869c3...96fe6ef7f33517b61c61be40b68a1882f3264fb8)

Updates `signpath/github-action-submit-signing-request` from 1.3 to 2.2
- [Release notes](https://github.com/signpath/github-action-submit-signing-request/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/signpath/github-action-submit-signing-request/compare/ced31329c0317e779dad2eec2a7c3bb46ea1343e...b9d91eadd323de506c0c81cf0c7fe7438f3360fd)

---
updated-dependencies:
- dependency-name: docker/setup-qemu-action
  dependency-version: 4.2.0
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-minor
  dependency-group: github-actions
- dependency-name: signpath/github-action-submit-signing-request
  dependency-version: '2.2'
  dependency-type: direct:production
  update-type: version-update:semver-major
  dependency-group: github-actions
...

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
2026-08-05 21:28:37 -05:00
Thibaud-Vdb b6d95a0ce5 CI: declares least-privilege token permissions
Jobs without a permissions block get the repository's default token
scope, and reusable workflow calls pass the caller's grants straight
through. Scopes are now derived from what each workflow actually does
with the token:

- every build workflow declares contents: read; none of them writes
  through the GITHUB_TOKEN.
- build-linux-hosts.yml keeps security-events: write for the CodeQL
  upload; the other callers had that grant too but never upload
  scanning results, so they drop it.
- build-windows-hosts.yml gets actions: read, which the SignPath
  action documents needing to read job details and download the
  unsigned artifact.
- build-release.yml declares contents: write, matching the grant its
  caller already makes for creating the release.

Runs that execute pull request code now hold a token that can do
nothing but read the repository.
2026-08-05 20:59:02 -05:00
Thibaud-Vdb b739dfee0b CI: pins actions to commit SHAs
A version tag like @v1 or a branch like @master is a movable pointer:
whoever controls the action repository can re-point it, and the next
run executes whatever it points at. Several of these actions run in
jobs whose outputs ship to users: build-release.yml creates the GitHub
release with the downloadable binaries, and build-windows-hosts.yml
holds the SignPath signing token, so a re-pointed tag there could ship
a tampered or wrongly signed release. This is exactly how the
tj-actions/changed-files compromise propagated (CVE-2025-30066).

Pinning by full commit SHA makes the reviewed code the code that runs,
the same way docker/setup-qemu-action is already pinned in
build-linux-vms.yml. Refs that pointed at master (cross-platform-actions,
setup-alpine, get-latest-release) are pinned to their latest release
tag. Every pin keeps a version comment, and each SHA was resolved from
the upstream repository and cross-checked against its release tag.
2026-08-05 20:59:02 -05:00
徐晓伟 dda39f0c67 CI (Linux): adds loong64 build workflow (#2469)
* CI: add loong64 build workflow

Add reusable workflow for building fastfetch on LoongArch 64-bit
architecture using QEMU user-mode emulation + Docker container
(lcr.loongnix.cn/debian:14). Integrate into CI pipeline and
release dependencies.

* CI (loong64): pin docker/setup-qemu-action to full commit SHA

Pin to 06116385d9baf250c9f4dcb4858b16962ea869c3 (v4.1.0) for
immutable action reference as required by Codacy.
2026-07-21 21:14:38 +08:00