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CI: pins actions to commit SHAs
A version tag like @v1 or a branch like @master is a movable pointer: whoever controls the action repository can re-point it, and the next run executes whatever it points at. Several of these actions run in jobs whose outputs ship to users: build-release.yml creates the GitHub release with the downloadable binaries, and build-windows-hosts.yml holds the SignPath signing token, so a re-pointed tag there could ship a tampered or wrongly signed release. This is exactly how the tj-actions/changed-files compromise propagated (CVE-2025-30066). Pinning by full commit SHA makes the reviewed code the code that runs, the same way docker/setup-qemu-action is already pinned in build-linux-vms.yml. Refs that pointed at master (cross-platform-actions, setup-alpine, get-latest-release) are pinned to their latest release tag. Every pin keeps a version comment, and each SHA was resolved from the upstream repository and cross-checked against its release tag.
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@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ jobs:
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steps:
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- name: checkout repository
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uses: actions/checkout@v7
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uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
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- name: Start VM
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uses: cross-platform-actions/action@master
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uses: cross-platform-actions/action@5ea7e8e4677bd726033a10b094ba1c5762b15dee # v1.3.0
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with:
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operating_system: haiku
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version: 'r1beta5'
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@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ jobs:
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run: ctest --output-on-failure
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- name: upload artifacts
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uses: actions/upload-artifact@v7
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uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
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with:
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name: fastfetch-haiku-amd64
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path: ./fastfetch-*.*
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